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Abstract
In 2018, clinics and hospitals were hit with numerous attacks
leading to significant data breaches and interruptions in
medical services. An attacker with access to medical records
can do much more than hold the data for ransom or sell it on
the black market.
In this paper, we show how an attacker can use deep-
learning to add or remove evidence of medical conditions
from volumetric (3D) medical scans. An attacker may perform
this act in order to stop a political candidate, sabotage research,
commit insurance fraud, perform an act of terrorism, or
even commit murder. We implement the attack using a 3D
conditional GAN and show how the framework (CT-GAN)
can be automated. Although the body is complex and 3D
medical scans are very large, CT-GAN achieves realistic
results which can be executed in milliseconds.
To evaluate the attack, we focused on injecting and
removing lung cancer from CT scans. We show how three
expert radiologists and a state-of-the-art deep learning AI are
highly susceptible to the attack. We also explore the attack
surface of a modern radiology network and demonstrate one
attack vector: we intercepted and manipulated CT scans in an
active hospital network with a covert penetration test.
1 Introduction
Medical imaging is the non-invasive process of producing
internal visuals of a body for the purpose of medical examina-
tion, analysis, and treatment. In some cases, volumetric (3D)
scans are required to diagnose certain conditions. The two
most common techniques for producing detailed 3D medical
imagery are Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), and CT
(Computed Tomography). Both MRI and CT scanner are
essential tools in the medical domain. In 2016, there were
approximately 38 million MRI scans and 79 million CT scans
performed in the United States [1].1
1245 CT scans and 118 MRI scans per 1,000 inhabitants.
MRI and CT scanners are similar in that they both create
3D images by taking many 2D scans of the body over the
axial plane (from front to back) along the body. The difference
between the two is that MRIs use powerful magnetic fields
and CTs use X-Rays. As a result, the two modalities capture
body tissues differently: MRIs are used to diagnose issues
with bone, joint, ligament, cartilage, and herniated discs.
CTs are used to diagnose cancer, heart disease, appendicitis,
musculoskeletal disorders, trauma, and infectious diseases [2].
Today, CT and MRI scanners are managed though a picture
archiving and communication system (PACS). A PACS is
essentially an Ethernet-based network involving a central
server which (1) receives scans from connected imaging
devices, (2) stores the scans in a database for later retrieval,
and (3) retrieves the scans for radiologists to analyze and
annotate. The digital medical scans are sent and stored using
the standardized DICOM format.2
1.1 The Vulnerability
The security of health-care systems has been lagging behind
modern standards [3–6]. This is partially because health-care
security policies mostly address data privacy (access-control)
but not data security (availability/integrity) [7]. Some PACS
are intentionally or accidentally exposed to the Internet
via web access solutions. Some example products include
Centricity PACS (GE Healthcare), IntelliSpace (Philips),
Synapse Mobility (FujiFilm), and PowerServer (RamSoft).
A quick search on Shodan.io reveals 1,849 medical image
(DICOM) servers and 842 PACS servers exposed to the
Internet. Recently, a researcher at McAfee demonstrated
how these web portals can be exploited to view and modify
a patient’s 3D DICOM imagery [8]. PACS which are not
directly connected to the Internet are indirectly connected via
the facility’s internal network [9]. They are also vulnerable to
social engineering attacks, physical access, and insiders [10].
2https://www.dicomstandard.org/about/
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Figure 1: By tampering with the medical imagery between
the investigation and diagnosis stages, both the radiologist and
the reporting physician believe the fallacy set by the attacker.
Therefore, a motivated attacker will likely be able to access
a target PACS and the medical imagery within it. Later in
section 4 we will discuss the attack vectors in greater detail.
1.2 The Threat
An attacker with access to medical imagery can alter the
contents to cause a misdiagnosis. Concretely, the attacker can
add or remove evidence of some medical condition. Fig. 1
illustrates this process where an attacker injects/removes lung
cancer from a scan.
Volumetric medical scans provide strong evidence of
medical conditions. In many cases, a patient may be treated
based on this evidence without the need to consider other
medical tests. For example, some lesions are obvious or
require immediate surgery. Moreover, some lesions will
legitimately not show up on other medical tests (e.g., meniscus
trauma and some breast cancers). Regardless, even if other
tests aren’t usually negative, ultimately, the evidence in the
scan will be used to diagnose and treat the patient. As a result,
an attacker with access to a scan has the power to change the
outcome of the patient’s diagnosis. For example, an attacker
can add or remove evidence of aneurysms, heart disease, blood
clots, infections, arthritis, cartilage problems, torn ligaments or
tendons, tumors in the brain, heart, or spine, and other cancers.
There are many reasons why an attacker would want to
alter medical imagery. Consider the following scenario: An
individual or state adversary wants to affect the outcome of
an election. To do so, the attacker adds cancer to a CT scan
performed on a political candidate (the appointment/referral
can be pre-existing, setup via social engineering, or part of
a lung cancer screening program). After learning of the cancer,
the candidate steps-down from his or her position. The same
scenario can be applied to existing leadership.
Table 1: Summary of an attacker’s motivations and goals for
injecting/removing evidence in 3D medical imagery. 
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Another scenario to consider is that of ransomware: An
attacker seeks out monetary gain by holding the integrity
of the medical imagery hostage. The attacker achieves this
by altering a few scans and then by demanding payment for
revealing which scans have been affected.
Furthermore, consider the case of insurance fraud: Some-
body alters his or her own medical records in order to receive
money directly from his or her insurance company, or receive
handicap benefits (e.g., lower taxes etc.) In this case, there is
no risk of physical injury to others, and the payout can be very
large. For example, one can (1) sign up for disability/life insur-
ance, then (2) fake a car accident or other incident, (3) complain
of an inability to work, sense, or sleep, then (4) add a small brain
hemorrhage or spinal fracture to his or her own scan during an
investigation (this evidence is very hard to refute), and then (5)
file a claim and receive cash from the insurance company.3
There are many more reasons why an attacker would want
to tamper with the imagery. For example: falsifying research
evidence, sabotaging another company’s research, job theft,
terrorism, assassination, and even murder.
Depending on the attacker’s goal, the attack may be either
untargeted or targeted:
Untargeted Attacks are where there is no specific target
patient. In this case, the attacker targets a victim who is
receiving a random voluntary cancer screening, is having
an annual scan (e.g., BRACA patients, smokers...), or is
being scanned due to an injury. These victims will either
have an ‘incidental finding’ when the radiologist reviews
3For example, see products such as AIG’s Quality of Life insurance.
the scan (injection) or are indeed sick but the evidence
won’t show (removal).
Targeted Attacks are where there is a specific target patient.
In these attacks, the patient may be lured to the hospital
for a scan. This can be accomplished by (1) adding
an appointment in the system, (2) crafting a cancer
screening invite, (3) spoofing the patient’s doctor, or (4)
tampering/appending the patient’s routine lab tests. For
example, high-PSA in blood indicates prostate cancer
leading to an abdominal MRI, high thyrotropin in blood
indicates a brain tumor leading to a head MRI, and
metanephrine in urine of hypertensive patients indicates
cancer/tumor leading to a chest/abdominal CT
In this paper we will focus on the injection and removal
of lung cancer from CT scans. Table 1 summarizes attacker’s
motivations, goals, and effects by doing so. The reason we
investigate this attack is because lung cancer is common
and has the highest mortality rate [11]. Therefore, due its
impact, an attacker is likely to manipulate lung cancer to
achieve his or her goal. We note that the threat, attack, and
countermeasures proposed in this paper also apply to MRIs
and medical conditions other than those listed above.
1.3 The Attack
With the help of machine learning, the domain of image
generation has advanced significantly over the last ten
years [12]. In 2014, there was a breakthrough in the domain
when Goodfellow et al. [13] introduced a special kind of
deep neural network called a generative adversarial network
(GAN). GANs consist of two neural networks which work
against each other: the generator and the discriminator. The
generator creates fake samples with the aim of fooling the
discriminator, and the discriminator learns to differentiate
between real and fake samples. When applied to images, the
result of this game helps the generator create fake imagery
which are photo realistic. While GANs have been used for
positive tasks, researchers have also shown how they can be
used for malicious tasks such as malware obfuscation [14, 15]
and misinformation (e.g., deepfakes [16]).
In this paper, we show how an attacker can realistically
inject and remove medical conditions with 3D CT scans. The
framework, called CT-GAN, uses two conditional GANs
(cGAN) to perform in-painting (image completion) [17] on
3D imagery. For injection, a cGAN is trained on unhealthy
samples so that the generator will always complete the images
accordingly. Conversely, for removal, another cGAN is trained
on healthy samples only.
To make the process efficient and the output anatomically
realistic, we perform the following steps: (1) locate where the
evidence should be inject/removed, (2) cut out a rectangular
cuboid from the location, (3) interpolate (scale) the cuboid, (4)
modify the cuboid with the cGAN, (5) rescale, and (6) paste
it back into the original scan. By dealing with a small portion
of the scan, the problem complexity is reduced by focusing
the GAN on the relevant area of the body (as opposed to the
entire CT). Moreover, the algorithm complexity is reduced
by processing fewer inputs4 (pixels) and concepts (anatomical
features). This results in fast execution and high anatomical
realism. The interpolation step is necessary because the scale
of a scan can be different between patients. To compensate for
the resulting interpolation blur, we mask the relevant content
according to water density in the tissue (Hounsfield units) and
hide the smoothness by adding Gaussian white noise. In order
to assist the GAN in generating realistic features, histogram
equalization is performed on the input samples. We found that
this transformation helps the 3D convolutional neural networks
in the GAN learn how to generate the subtle features found
in the human body. The entire process is automated, meanings
that the attack can be deployed in an air gapped PACS.
To verify the threat of this attack, we trained CT-GAN
to inject/remove lung cancer and hired three radiologists to
diagnose a mix of 70 tampered and 30 authentic CT scans.
The radiologists diagnosed 99% of the injected patients with
malign cancer, and 94% of cancer removed patients as being
healthy. After informing the radiologists of the attack, they
still misdiagnosed 60% of those with injections, and 87% of
those with removals. In addition to the radiologists, we also
showed how CT-GAN is an effective adversarial machine
learning attack. We found that the state-of-the-art lung cancer
screening model misdiagnosed 100% of the tampered patients.
Thus, cancer screening tools, used by some radiologists, are
also vulnerable to this attack.
This attack is a concern because infiltration of healthcare
networks has become common [3], and internal network
security is often poor [18]. Moreover, for injection, the attacker
is still likely to succeed even if medical treatment is not
performed. This is because many goals rely on simply scaring
the patient enough to affect his/her daily/professional life. For
example, even if an immediate deletion surgery is not deemed
necessary based on the scan and lab results, there will still be
weekly/monthly follow-up scans to track the tumor’s growth.
This will affect the patient’s life given the uncertainty of his
or her future.
1.4 The Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, it has not been shown how an
attacker can maliciously alter the content of a 3D medical im-
age in a realistic and automated way. Therefore, this is the first
comprehensive research which exposes, demonstrates, and ver-
ifies the threat of an attacker manipulating 3D medical imagery.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
The Attack Model We are the first to present how an attacker
can infiltrate a PACS network and then use malware
to autonomously tamper 3D medical imagery. We also
provide a systematic overview of the attack, vulnerabilities,
attack vectors, motivations, and attack goals. Finally,
we demonstrate one possible attack vector through a
penetration test performed on a hospital where we covertly
4A 3D CT scan can have over 157 million pixels whereas the latest
advances in GANs can only handle about 2 million pixels (HD images).
connect a man-in-the-middle device to an actual CT scanner.
By performing this pen-test, we provide insights into the
security of a modern hospital’s internal network.
Attack Implementation We are the first to demonstrate
how GANs, with the proper preprocessing, can be used to
efficiently, realistically, and automatically inject/remove
lung cancer into/from large 3D CT scans. We also evaluate
how well the algorithm can deceive both humans and
machines: radiologists and state-of-the-art AI. We also show
how this implementation might be used by an attacker since
it can be automated (in the case of an air gapped system)
and is fast (in the case of an infected DICOM viewer).
Countermeasures We enumerate various countermeasures
which can be used to mitigate the threat. We also provide
the reader with best practices and configurations which can
be implemented immediately to help prevent this attack.
For reproducibility and further investigation, we have
published our tampered datasets and source code online5
along with a pen-test video.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First
we present a short background on GANs. Then, in section 3,
we review related works and contrast them ours. In section
4 we present the attack model and demonstrate one of the
attack vectors. In section 5, we present CT-GAN’s neural
architecture, its attack process, and some samples. In section
6 we evaluate the quality of the manipulations and asses the
threat of the attack. Finally, in sections 7 and 8 we present
countermeasures and our conclusion.
2 Background: GANs
The most basic GAN consists of two neural networks: the
generator (G) and discriminator (D). The objective of the
GAN is to generate new images which are visually similar to
real images found in a sample data distribution X (i.e., a set
of images). The input to G is the random noise vector z drawn
from the prior distribution p(z) (e.g., a Gaussian distribution).
The output of G, denoted xg, is an image which is expected
to have visual similarity with those in X . Let the non-linear
function learned by G parametrized by θg be denoted as
xg = G(z;θg). The input to D is either a real image xr ∈ X
or a generated image xg ∈ G(Z;θg). The output of D is the
probability that xg is real or fake. Let the non-linear function
learned by D parametrized by θd be denoted as xd =D(x;θd).
The top of Fig. 2 illustrates the configuration of a classic GAN.
It can be seen that D and G are playing a zero-sum game
where G is trying to find better (more realistic) samples to fool
D, while D is learning to catch every fake sample generated
by G. After training, D is discarded and G is used to generate
new samples.
A cGAN is a GAN which has a generator and discriminator
conditioned on an additional input (e.g., class labels). This
5https://github.com/ymirsky/CT-GAN
6https://youtu.be/_mkRAArj-x0
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Figure 2: A schematic view of a classic GAN (top) and a
cGAN setup for in-painting.
input extends the latent space z with further information
thus assisting the network to generate and discriminate
images better. In [17] the authors propose an image-to-image
translation framework using cGANs (a.k.a. pix2pix). There
the authors showed how deep convolutional cGANs can be
used to translate images from one domain to another. For
example, converting casual photos to a Van Gogh paintings.
One application of the pix2pix framework is in-painting;
the process of completing a missing part of an image. When
using pix2pix to perform in-painting, the generator tries to
fill in a missing part of an image based on the surrounding
context, and its past experience (other images seen during
training). Meanwhile, the discriminator tries to differentiate
between completed images and original images, given the
surrounding context. Concretely, the input to G is a copy of
xr where missing regions of the image are replaced with zeros.
We denote this masked input as x∗r . The output of G is the
completed image, visually similar to those in X . The input
to D is either the concatenation (x∗r ,xr) or (x∗r ,G(x∗r ;θg)). The
bottom of Fig. 2 illustrates the described cGAN. The process
for training this kind of GAN is as follows:
Training Procedure for cGAN In-painting
Repeat for k training iterations:
1. Pull a random batch of samples xr ∈ X , and mask the
samples with zeros to produce the respective x∗r .
2. Train D:
2.1. Forward propagate (x∗r ,xr) through D, compute the
error given the label y=0, and back propagate the
error through D to update θd .
2.2. Forward propagate (x∗r , G(x∗r ; θg)) through D,
compute the error given the label y = 1, and back
propagate the error through D to update θd .
3. Train G:
3.1. Forward propagate x∗r through G and then
(x∗r ,G(x∗r ;θg)) through D, compute the error at the
output of D given the label y = 0, back propagate
the error through D to G without updating θd , and
continue the back propagation through G while
updating θg.
Although pix2pix does not use a latent random input z, it
avoids deterministic outputs by performing random dropouts
in the generator during training. this forces the network to
learn multiple representations of the data.
We note that there is a GAN called a CycleGAN [19] that can
directly translate images between two domains (e.g., benign↔
malign). However, we found that the CycleGAN was unable
to inject realistic cancer into 3D samples. Therefore, we opted
to use the pix2pix model for in-painting because it produced
much better results. This may be due to the complexity of the
anatomy in the 3D samples and the fact that we had relatively
few training samples. Since labeled datasets contain at most a
few hundred scans, our approach is more likely to be used by an
attacker. Another reason is that in-painting is arguably easier
to perform than ‘style transfer’ when considering different
bodies. Regardless, in-painting ensures that the final image can
be seamlessly pasted back into the scan without border effects.
3 Related Work
The concept of tampering medical imagery, and the use of
GANs on medical imagery, is not new. In this section we briefly
review these subjects and compare prior results to our work.
3.1 Tampering with Medical Images
Many works have proposed methods for detecting forgeries
in medical images [20], but none have focused on the attack
itself. The most common methods of image forgery are:
copying content from one image to another (image splicing),
duplicating content within the same image to cover up or add
something (copy-move), and enhancing an image to give it
a different feel (image retouching) [21].
Copy-move attacks can be used to cover up evidence or dupli-
cate existing evidence (e.g., a tumor). However, duplicating evi-
dence will raise suspicion because radiologists closely analyze
each discovered instance. Image-splicing can be used to copy
evidence from one scan to another. However, CT scanners have
distinct local noise patterns which are visually noticeable [22,
23]. The copied patterns would not fit the local pattern and thus
raise suspicion. More importantly, both copy-move and image-
splicing techniques are performed using 2D image editing soft-
ware such as Photoshop. These tools require a digital artist to
manually edit the scan. Even if the attacker has a digital artist, it
is hard to accurately inject and remove cancer realistically. This
is because human bodies are complex and diverse. For exam-
ple, cancers and tumors are usually attached to nearby anatomy
(lung walls, bronchi, etc.) which may be hard to alter accurately
under the scrutiny of expert radiologists. Another consideration
is that CT scans are 3D and not 2D, which adds to the difficulty.
It is also important to note that an attacker will likely need to
automate the entire process in a malware since (1) many PACS
are not directly connected to the Internet and (2) the diagnosis
may occur immediately after the scan is performed.
In contrast to the Photoshopping approach, CT-GAN
(1) works on 3D medical imagery, which provide stronger
evidence than a 2D scans, (2) realistically alters the contents
of a 3D scan while considering nearby anatomy, and (3) can be
completely automated. The latter point is important because
(1) some PACS are not directly connected to the Internet,
(2) diagnosis can happen right after the actual scan, (3) the
malware may be inside the radiologist’s viewing app.
3.2 GANs in Medical Imagery
Since 2016, over 100 papers relating to GANs and medical
imaging have been published [24]. These publications mostly
relate image reconstruction, denoising, image generation (syn-
thesis), segmentation, detection, classification, and registration.
We will focus on the use of GANs to generate medical images.
Due to privacy laws, it is hard to acquire medical scans
for training models and students. As a result, the main focus
of GANs in this domain has been towards augmenting
(expanding) datasets. One approach is to convert imagery
from one modality to another. For example, in [25] the authors
used cGANs to convert 2D slices of CT images to Positron
Emission Tomography (PET) images. In [26, 27] the authors
demonstrated a similar concept using a fully convolutional
network with a cGAN architecture. In [28], the authors
converted MRI images to CT images using domain adaptation.
In [29], the authors converted MRI to CT images and vice
versa using a CycleGAN.
Another approach to augmenting medical datasets is the
generation of new instances. In [30], the authors use a deep
convolutional GAN (DCGAN) to generate 2D brain MRI
images with a resolution of 220x172. In [31], the authors
used a DCGAN to generate 2D liver lesions with a resolution
of 64x64. In [32], the authors generated 3D blood vessels
using a Wasserstien (WGAN). In [33], the authors use a
Laplace GAN (LAPGAN) to generate skin lesion images with
256x256 resolution. In [34], the authors train two DCGANs
for generating 2D chest X-rays (one for malign and the other
for benign). However, in [34], the generated samples were
down sampled to 128x128 in resolution since this approach
could not be scaled to the original resolution of 2000x3000.
In [35] the authors generated 2D images of pulmonary lung
nodules (lung cancer) with 56x56 resolution. The author’s
motivation was to create realistic datasets for doctors to
practice on. The samples were generated using a DCGAN and
their realism was assessed with help of two radiologists. The
authors found that the radiologists were unable to accurately
differentiate between real and fake samples.
These works contrast to our work in the following ways:
1. We are the first to introduce the use of GANs as a way
to tamper with 3D imagery. The other works focused
on synthesizing cancer samples for boosting classifiers,
experiments, and training students, but not for malicious
attacks. We also provide an overview of how the attack
can be accomplished in a modern medical system.
2. All of the above works either generate small regions of
a scan without the context of a surrounding body or gen-
erate a full 2D scan with a very low resolution. Samples
which are generated without a context cannot be realis-
tically ‘pasted’ back into any arbitrary medical scan. We
generate/remove content realistically within existing bod-
ies. Moreover, very low-resolution images of full scans
cannot replace existing ones without raising suspicion
(especially if the body doesn’t match the actual person).
Our approach can modify full resolution 3D scans,7 and
the approach can be easily extended to 2D as well.
3. We are the first to evaluate how well a GAN can fool
expert radiologists and state-of-the-art AI in full 3D
lung cancer screening. Moreover, in our evaluation, the
radiologists and AI were able to consider how the cancer
was attached and placed within the surrounding anatomy.
4 The Attack Model
In this section we explore the attack surface by first presenting
the network topology and then by discussing the possible
vulnerabilities and attack vectors. We also demonstrate one
of the attack vectors on an actual CT scanner.
4.1 Network Topology
In order to discuss the attack vectors we must first present the
PACS network topology. Fig. 3 presents the common network
configuration of PACS used in hospitals. The topology is based
on PACS literature [9, 36–38], PACS enterprise solutions
(e.g., Carestream), and our own surveys conducted on various
hospitals. We note that, private medical clinics may have a
much simpler topology and are sometimes directly connected
to the Internet [8].
The basic elements of a PACS are as follows:
PACS Server. The heart of the PACS system. It is responsible
for storing, organizing, and retrieving DICOM imagery and
reports commonly via SQL. Although the most facilities
use local servers, a few hospitals have transitioned to cloud
storage [39].
RIS Server. The radiology information system (RIS) is re-
sponsible for managing medical imagery and associated data.
Its primary use is for tracking radiology imaging orders and
the reports of the radiologists. Doctors in the hospital’s inter-
nal network can interface with the RIS to order scans, receive
the resulting reports, and to obtain the DICOM scans [40].
Modality Workstation. A PC (typically Windows) which
is used to control an imaging modality such as a CT
scanner. During an appointment, the attending technician
configures and captures the imagery via the workstation.
The workstation sends all imagery in DICOM format to the
PACS server for storage.
Radiologist Workstation. A radiologist can retrieve and
view scans stored on the PACS server from various locations.
7A CT scan can have a resolution from 512x512x600 to 1024x1024x600
and larger.
The most common location is a viewing workstation within
the department. Other locations include the radiologist’s
personal PC (local or remote via VPN), and sometimes a
mobile device (via the Internet or within the local network).
Web Server. An optional feature which enables radiologists
to view of DICOM scans (in the PACS server) over the
Internet. The content may be viewed though a web browser
(e.g., medDream and Orthanc [41]), an app on a mobile
device (e.g., FujiFilm’s Synapse Mobility), or accessed via
a web API (e.g., Dicoogle [42]).
Administrative Assistant’s PC. This workstation has both
Internet access (e.g., for emails) and access to the PACS net-
work. Access to the PACS is enabled so that the assistant can
maintain the devices’ schedules: When a patient arrives at
the imaging modality, for safety reasons, the technician con-
firms the patient’s identity with the details sent to the modal-
ity’s workstation (entered by the assistant). This ensures that
the scans are not accidentally mixed up between the patients.
Hospital Network. Other departments within the hospital
usually have access to the PACS network. For example,
Oncology, Cardiology, Pathology, and OR/Surgery. In these
cases, various workstations around the hospital can load
DICOM files from the server given the right credentials.
Furthermore, it is common for a hospital to deploy Wi-Fi
access points, which are connected to the internal network,
for employee access.
4.2 Attack Scenario
The attack scenario is as follows: An attacker wants to achieve
one of the goals listed in Table 1 by injecting/removing medical
evidence. In order to cause the target effect, the attacker will
alter the contents of the target’s CT scan(s) before the radiol-
ogist performs his or her diagnosis. The attacker will achieve
this by either targeting the data-at-rest or data-in-motion.
Thedata-at-rest refers to the DICOM files stored on the
PACS Server, or on the radiologist’s personal computer (saved
for later viewing). In some cases, DICOM files are stored on
DVDs and then transferred to the hospital by the patient or
an external doctor. Although the DVD may be swapped by
the attacker, it is more likely the interaction will be via the
network. The data-in-motion refers to DICOM files being
transferred across the network or loaded into volatile memory
by an application (e.g., a DICOM viewer).
We note that this scenario does not apply to the case where
the goal is to falsify or sabotage research. Moreover, for
insurance fraud, an attacker will have a much easier time
targeting a small medical clinic. For simplicity, we will assume
that the target PACS is in a hospital.
4.3 Target Assets
To capture/modify a medical scan, an attacker must compro-
mise at least one of the assets numbered in Fig. 3. By compro-
mising one of (1-4), the attacker gains access to every scan. By
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Figure 3: A network overview a PACS in a hospital. 1-3: points where an attacker can tamper with all scans. 4-5: points where
an attacker can tamper with a subset of scans.
compromising (5) or (6), the attacker only gains access to a sub-
set of scans. The RIS (3) can give the attacker full control over
the PACS server (2), but only if the attacker can obtain the right
credentials or exploit the RIS software. The network wiring be-
tween the modalities and the PACS server (4) can be used to in-
stall a man-in-the-middle device. This device can modify data-
in-motion if it is not encrypted (or if the protocol is flawed).
In all cases, it is likely that the attacker will infect the
target asset with a custom malware, outlined in Fig. 4. This
is because there may not be a direct route to the PACS via the
Internet or because the diagnosis may take place immediately
after the scan is taken.
4.4 Attack Vectors
There are many ways in which an attacker can reach the assets
marked in Fig. 3. In general, the attack vectors involve either
remote or local infiltration of the facility’s network.
Remote Infiltration. The attacker may be able to exploit
vulnerabilities in elements facing the Internet, providing the
attacker with direct access to the PACS from the Internet
(e.g., [8]). Another vector is to perform a social engineering at-
tack. For example, a spear phishing attack on the department’s
administrative assistant to infect his/her workstation with a
backdoor, or a phishing attack on the technician to have him
install fraudulent updates.
If the PACS is not directly connected to the Internet, an alter-
native vector is to (1) infiltrate the hospital’s internal network
and then (2) perform lateral movement to the PACS. This is
Figure 4: The tampering process of an autonomous malware.
possible because PACS is usually connected to the internal
network (using static routes and IPs), and the internal network
is connected to the Internet (evident from the recent wave of
cyber-attacks on medical facilities [3, 43–45]). The bridge be-
tween the internal network and the PACS is to enable doctors to
view scans/reports and to enable the administrative assistant to
manage patient referrals [9]. Another vector from the Internet is
to compromise a remote site (e.g., a partnered hospital or clinic)
which is linked to the hospital’s internal network. Furthermore,
the attacker may also try to infect a doctor’s laptop or phone
with a malware which will open a back door into the hospital.
If the attacker knows that radiologist analyzes scans on his
or her personal computer, then the attacker can infect the radi-
ologist’s device or DICOM viewer remotely with the malware.
Local Infiltration. The attacker can gain physical access to
the premises with a false pretext, such as being a technician
from Philips who needs to run a diagnostic on the CT scanner.
The attacker may also hire an insider or even be an insider. A
recent report shows that 56% of cyber attacks on the healthcare
industry come from internal threats [10].
Once inside, the attacker can plant the malware or a back
door by (1) connecting a device to exposed network infrastruc-
ture (ports, wires, ...) [46] or (2) by accessing an unlocked work-
station. Another vector which does not involve access to a re-
stricted area, is to access to the internal network by hacking Wi-
Fi access points. This can be accomplished using existing vul-
nerabilities such as ’Krack’ [47] or the more recent ‘Bleeding-
Bit’ vulnerabilities which have affected many hospitals [48].
Compromising the PACS. Once access to the PACS has
been achieved, there are numerous ways an attacker can
compromise a target asset. Aside from exploiting misconfig-
urations or default credentials, the attacker can exploit known
software vulnerabilities. With regards to PACS servers, some
already disclose private information/credentials which can
be exploited remotely to create of admin accounts, and have
hard-coded credentials.8 A quick search on exploit-db.com
8CVE-2017-14008 and CVE-2018-17906
Figure 5: Left: The CT scanner and the medical dummy used
to validate the attack. Top-right: the Pi-bridge used to intercept
the scans. Bottom-right: one of the dummy’s slices, sent by
the CT scanner, and intercepted by the Pi-bridge.
reveals seven implemented exploits for PACS servers in 2018
alone. With regards to modality workstations, they too have
been found to have significant vulnerabilities [49]. In 2018
the US Department of Homeland Security exposed ‘low skill’
vulnerabilities in Philips’ Brilliance CT scanners [50]. For
example, improper authentication, OS command injection,
and hard-coded credentials.9 Other recent vulnerabilities
include hard-coded credentials.10
Given the state of health-care security, and that systems
such as CT scanners are rarely given software updates [51],
it is likely that these vulnerabilities and many more exist.
Once the target asset in the PACS has been compromised, the
attacker will be able to install the malware and manipulate the
scans of target patients.
4.5 Attack Demonstration
To demonstrate how an attacker can access and manipulate CT
scans, we performed a penetration test on a hospital’s radiology
department. The pen-test was performed with full permission
of the participating hospital. To gain access to all CT scans,
we performed a man-in-the-middle attack on the CT scanner
using a Raspberry Pi 3B. The Pi was given a USB-to-Ethernet
adapter, and was configured as a passive network bridge
(without network identifiers). The Pi was also configured as a
hidden Wi-Fi access point for backdoor access. We also printed
a 3D logo of the CT scanner’s manufacturer and glued it to the
Pi to make it less conspicuous. The pen-test was performed as
follows: First we waited at night until the cleaning staff opened
the doors. Then we found the CT scanner’s room and installed
the Pi-bridge between the scanner’s workstation and the PACs
network (location #2 in Fig. 3). Finally, we hid the Pi-bridge un-
der an access panel in the floor. The entire installation process
took 30 seconds to complete. We were able to connect to the Pi
wirelessly from the waiting room (approximately 20m away)
to monitor the device’s status, change the target identifier, etc.
9CVE-2018-8853, CVE-2018-8857, and CVE-2018-8861
10CVE-2017-9656
At this point, an attacker could either intercept scans
directly or perform lateral movement through the PACS to
other subsystems and install the malware there. To verify that
we could intercept and manipulate the scans, we scanned a
medical dummy (Fig. 5). We found that the scan of the dummy
was sent over the network twice: once in cleartext over TCP to
an internal web viewing service, and again to the PACS storage
server using TLSv1.2. However, to our surprise, the payload of
the TLS transmission was also in cleartext. Moreover, within
10 minutes, we obtained the usernames and passwords of over
27 staff members and doctors due to multicasted Ethernet
traffic containing HTTP POST messages sent in cleartext. A
video of the pen-test can be found online.11
These vulnerabilities were disclosed to the hospital’s IT staff
and to their PACS software provider. Though inquiry, we found
that it is not common practice for hospitals to encrypt their
internal PACs traffic [52]. One reason is compatibility: hos-
pitals often have old components (scanners, portals, databases,
...) which do not support encryption. Another reason is some
PACS are not directly connected to the Internet, and thus is
it erroneously thought that there is no need for encryption.
5 The CT-GAN Framework
In this section, we present the technique which an attacker
can use to add/remove evidence in CT scans. First, we present
the CT-GAN architecture and how to train it. Then, we will
describe the entire tampering process and present some sample
results. As a case study, we will focus on injecting/removing
lung cancer.
It is important to note that there are many types of lung
cancer. A common type of cancer forms a round mass of
tissue called a solitary pulmonary nodule. Most nodules with
a diameter less than 8mm are benign. However, nodules which
are larger may indicate a malign cancerous growth. Moreover,
if numerous nodules having a diameter >8mm are found, then
the patient has an increased risk of primary cancer [53]. For
this attack, we will focus on injecting and removing multiple
solitary pulmonary nodules.
5.1 The Neural Architecture
A single slice in a CT scan has a resolution of at least 512x512
pixels. Each pixel in a slice measures the radiodensity at that
location in Hounsfield units (HU). The CT scan of a human’s
lungs can have over 157 million voxels12 (512x512x600). In
order to train a GAN on an image of this size, we first locate
a candidate location (voxel) and then cut out a small region
around it (cuboid) for processing. The selected region is
slightly larger than needed in order to provide the cGAN with
context of the surrounding anatomy. This enables the cGAN
to generate/remove lung cancers which connect to the body
in a realistic manner.
11https://youtu.be/_mkRAArj-x0
12A voxel is the three dimensional equivalent of a pixel.
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Figure 6: The network architecture, layers, and parameters used for both the injection (GANinj) and removal (GANrem) networks.
Figure 7: Training samples after 100 epochs showing the
middle slice only. Top: the masked sample x∗r given to both the
generator Gin j and discriminator Din j. Middle: The in-painted
image xg produced by the Gin j. Bottom: the ground-truth xr.
Note, Din j sees either (x∗r , xr) or (x∗r , xg).
To accurately capture the concepts of injection and removal,
we use a framework consisting of two cGANs: one for inject-
ing cancer (GANinj) and one for removing cancer (GANrem).
Both GANinj and GANrem are deep 3D convolutional cGANs
trained to perform in-painting on samples which are 323
voxels in dimension. For the completion mask, we zero-out
a 163 cube in the center of the input sample. To inject a large
pulmonary nodule into a CT scan, we train GANinj on cancer
samples which have a diameter of least 10mm. As a result,
the trained generator completes sample cuboids with similar
sized nodules. To remove cancer, GANrem is trained using the
same architecture, but with samples containing benign lung
nodules only (having a diameter <3mm).
The model architecture (layers and configurations) used for
both GANinj and GANrem is illustrated in Fig. 6. Overall,θg and
θd had 162.6 million and 26.9 million trainable parameters
respectively (189.5 million in total).
We note that follow up CT scans are usually ordered when
a large nodule is found. This is because nodule growth is a
strong indicator of cancer [53]. We found that an attacker is
able to simulate this growth by conditioning each cancerous
training sample on the nodule’s diameter. However, the
objective of this paper is to show how GANS can add/remove
evidence realistically. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity,
we have omitted this ‘feature’ from the above model.
5.2 Training CT-GAN
To train the GANs, we used a free dataset of 888 CT scans
collected in the LIDC-IDRI lung cancer screening trial [54].
The dataset came with annotations from radiologists: the
locations and diameters of pulmonary nodules having
diameters greater than 3mm. In total there were 1186 nodules
listed in the annotations.
To create the training set for GANinj, we extracted from
the CT scans all nodules with a diameter between 10mm
and 16mm (169 in total). To increase the number of training
samples, we performed data augmentation: For each of the 169
cuboid samples, we (1) flipped the cuboid on the x, y, and xy
planes, (2) shifted the cuboid by 4 pixels in each direction on
the xy plane, and (3) rotated the cuboid 360 degrees at 6 degree
intervals. This produced an additional 66 instances for each
sample. The final training set had 11,323 training samples.
To create the training set for GANrem, we first selected clean
CT scans which had no nodules detected by the radiologists. On
these scans, we used the nodule detection algorithm from [55]
(also provided in the dataset’s annotations) to find benign
micro nodules. Of the detected micro nodules, we selected 867
nodules at random and performed the same data augmentation
as above. The final training set had 58,089 samples.
Prior to training the GANs, all of the samples were
preprocessed with scaling, equalization, and normalization
(described in the next section in detail). Both of the GANs
were trained on their respective datasets for 200 epochs with a
batch size of 50 samples. Each GAN took 26 hours to complete
its training on an NVIDIA GeForce GTX TITAN X using all
of the GPU’s memory. Fig. 7 shows how well GANinj was able
to in-paint cancer patterns after 150 epochs.
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Figure 8: Top: the complete cancer injection/removal process. Bottom: sample images from the injection process. The grey
numbers indicate from which step the image was taken. The sample 2D images are the middle slice of the respective 3D cuboid.
5.3 Execution: The Tampering Process
In order to inject/remove lung cancer, pre/post-processing
steps are required. The following describes the entire
injection/removal process as illustrated in Fig. 8:
1. Capture Data. The CT scan is captured (as data-at-rest or
data-in-motion) in either raw or DICOM format using one
of the attack vectors from section 4.
2. Localize & Cut. A candidate location is selected where
cancer will be injected/removed, and then the cuboid x′r
is cut out around it.
Injection: An injection location can be selected in one
of two ways. The fastest way is to take one of the middle
slices of the CT scan and select a random location
near the middle of the left or right half (see Fig. 16 in
the appendix). With 888 CT scans, this strategy gave
us a 99.1% successes rate. A more precise way is to
execute an existing nodule detection algorithm to find a
random micro nodule. To improve speed, the algorithm
can be given only a few slices and implemented with
early stopping. In our evaluation, we used the algorithm
in [55], though many other options are available.
Removal: A removal location can be found by selecting
the largest nodule with [55], or by using a pre-trained
deep learning cancer detection model.13
3. Scale. x′r is scaled to the original 1:1:1 ratio using 3D spline
interpolation.14 The ratio information is available in the
DICOM meta data with the tags (0x0028,0x0030) and
(0x0018,0x0050). Scaling is necessary because each scan
is stored with a different aspect ratio, and a GAN needs
13Pre-trained models are available here:
https://concepttoclinic.drivendata.org/algorithms
14In Python: scipy.ndimage.interpolation.zoom
consistent units to produce accurate results. To minimize
the computations, the cuboid cut in step 2 is cut with the
exact dimensions so that the result of the rescaling process
produces a 323 cube.
4-5. Equalize & Normalize. Histogram equalization is applied
to the cube to increase contrast. This is a critical step
since it enables the GAN to learn subtle features in the
anatomy Normalization is then applied using the formula
Xn=2
X−min(X)
max(X)−min(X)−1. This normalization ensures that all
values fall on the range of [−1,1]which helps the GAN learn
the features better. The output of this process is the cube xr.
6. Mask. In the center of xr, a 163 cube is masked with zeros
to form x∗r . The masked area will be in-painted (completed)
by the generator, and the unmasked area is the context).
7. Inject/Remove. x∗r is passed through the chosen discrim-
inator (Ginj or Grem) creating a new sample (xg) with new
3D generated content.
8-10. Reverse Preprocessing. xg is unnormalized, unequalized,
and then rescaled with spline interpolation back to its
original proportions, forming x′g.
11. Touch-up. The result of the interpolation usually blurs the
imagery. In order to hide this artifact from the radiologists,
we added Gaussian noise to the sample: we set µ= 0 and
σ to the sampled standard deviation of x′r. To get a clean
sample of the noise, we only measured voxels with values
less than−600 HU. Moreover, to copy the relevant content
into the scan, we merged the original cuboid (x′r) with the
generated one (x′g) using a sigmoid weighted average.
Let W be the weight function defined as
Wα,β(x)=
1
1+e−(x+α)/β
∗G(x) (1)
where parameter α is the HU threshold between wanted
and unwanted tissue densities, and parameter β controls
the smoothness of the cut edges. The function G(x) returns
a 0-1 normalized Gaussian kernel with the dimensions of
x. G(x) is used to decay the contribution of each voxel the
further it is the cuboid’s center.
With W , we define the merging function as
mergeα,β(x,y)=Wα,β(x)∗x+
(
1−Wα,β(x)
)∗y (2)
where x is source (x′g) and y is the destination (x′r). We
found that setting α = 500 and β = 70 worked best. By
applying these touch-ups, the final cuboid x∗g is produced.
12. Paste. The cuboid x∗g is pasted back into the CT scan at the
selected location. See Fig. 16 in the appendix for one slice
of a complete scan.
13. Repeat. If the attacker is removing cancer, then return to
step 2 until no more nodules with a diameter > 3mm are
found. If the attacker is injecting cancer, then (optionally)
return to step 2 until four injections have been performed.
The reason for this is because the risk of a patient being
diagnosed with cancer is statistically greater in the presence
of exactly four solitary pulmonary nodules having a
diameter >8mm [53].
14. Return Data. The scan is converted back into the original
format (e.g. DICOM) and returned back to the source.
The quality of the injection/removal process can be viewed
in figures 9 and 10. Fig. 9 presents a variety of examples before
and after tampering, and Fig. 10 provides a 3D visualization
of a cancer being injected and removed. More visual samples
can be found in the appendix (figures 19 and 20).
We note that although some steps involve image touch-ups,
the entire process is automatic (unlike Photoshop) and thus can
be deployed in an autonomous malware or inside a viewing
application (real-time tampering). We note that the same
neural architecture and tampering process works on other
modalities and medical conditions. For example, Fig. 18 in the
appendix shows CT-GAN successfully injecting brain tumors
into MRI head scans.
6 Evaluation
In this section we present our evaluation on how well the CT-
GAN attack can fool expert radiologists and state-of-the-art AI.
6.1 Experiment Setup
To evaluate the attack, we recruited three radiologists
(denoted R1, R2, and R3) with 2, 5, and 7 years of experience
respectively. We also used a trained lung cancer screening
model (denoted AI), the same deep learning model which won
the 2017 Kaggle Data Science Bowl (a $1 million competition
for diagnosing lung cancer).15
15Source code and model available here: https://github.com/lfz/
DSB2017
,QMHFWLRQ 5HPRYDO
Figure 9: Sample injections (left) and removals (right). For
each image, the left side is before tampering and the right side
is after. Note that only the middle 2D slice is shown.
Figure 10: A 3D sample of injection (left) and removal (right)
before (blue) and after (red) tampering with the CT scan.
Table 2: Summary of the scans and the relevant notations
The experiment was performed in two trials: blind and open.
In the blind trial, the radiologists were asked to diagnose 80
complete CT scans of lungs, but they were not told the purpose
of the experiment or that some of the scans were manipulated.
In the open trial, the radiologists were told about the attack,
and were asked to identify fake, real, and removed nodules
in 20 CT scans. In addition, the radiologists were asked to
rate the confidence of their decisions. After each trial, we gave
the radiologists a questionnaire to assess how susceptible they
were to the attacks. In all cases, the radiologists were asked
to only detect and diagnose pulmonary nodules which have
a diameter greater than 3mm.
The CT scans were taken from the LIDC-IDRI dataset [54].
The set of CT scans used in each trial and the notations used
in this section are available in Table 2.
Table 3: Cancer Detection Performance - Blind Trial
Table 4: Attack Detection Confusion Matrix - Open Trial
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Figure 11: Attack success rates - Both Trials.
False benign (FB) and true malign (TM) scans truthfully
contained at least one nodule with a diameter between 10mm
and 16mm. FB scans were made by removing every nodule
in the scan. FM scans were made by randomly injecting 1-4
nodules into a benign scan, where the injected nodules had
a diameter of 14.4mm on average. In total, there were 100 CT
scans analyzed by each of the radiologists, and the radiologists
spent approximately 10 minutes analyzing each of these scans.
We note that the use of three radiologists is common
practice in medical research (e.g., [56]). Moreover, we found
that radiologists (and AI) significantly agreed with each
other’s diagnosis per patient and per nodule. We verified
this agreement by computing Fliess’ kappa [57] (a statistical
interrater reliability measure) which produced an excellent
kappa of 0.84 (p-value < 0.0001). Therefore, adding more
radiologists will likely not affect the results.
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Figure 12: Malignancy of injected cancers (FM) - Blind Trial.
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Figure 13: Attack detection performance - Open Trial.
6.2 Results: Blind Trial
In Table 3 we present the cancer detection performance of
the radiologists and AI. The table lists the number of false-
positives (FP - detected a non-existent cancer), true-positives
(TP - detected a real cancer), false-negatives (FN - missed a
real cancer), and their respective rates. The TCIA annotations
(nodule locations) were used as our ground truth for measuring
the performance on FB and TM scans. We evaluated these met-
rics per instance of cancer, and per patient as a whole. All four
detectors performed well on the baseline (TB and TM) having
an average TPR of 0.975 and a TNR of 1.0 in diagnosing the
patients, meaning that we can rely on their diagnosis.
The top of Fig. 11 summarizes the attack success rates for
the blind trial. In general, the attack had an average success
rate of 99.2% for cancer injection and 95.8% for cancer
removal. The AI was fooled completely which is an important
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Figure 14: Confidence in detecting attacks - Open Trial.
aspect since some radiologists use AI tools to support their
analysis (e.g. the Philips IntelliSite Pathology Solution). The
radiologists were fooled less so, primarily due to human error
(e.g., missing a nodule). When asked, none of the radiologists
reported anything abnormal with the scans with the exception
of R2 who noted some noise in the area of one removal (FB).
This may be attributed to “inattentional blindness,” where
one may miss an obvious event (artifacts) while engaged in a
different task (searching for large nodules). In [58], the authors
showed that this phenomenon also affects radiologists.
With regards to the injected cancers (FM), the consensus
among the radiologists was that one-third of the injections re-
quire an immediate surgery/biopsy, and that all of the injections
require follow-up treatments/referrals. When asked to rate the
overall malignancy of the FM patients, the radiologists said
that nearly all cases were significantly malign and pose a risk
to the patient if left untreated. Fig. 12 summarizes radiologists’
ratings of the FM patients. One interesting observation is that
the malignancy rating increased with the experience of the
radiologist. Finally, we note that an attacker could increase the
overall malignancy of the injections if CT-GAN were trained
only on samples with high malignancy and/or a larger diameter.
6.3 Results: Open Trial
In Table 4 we present the radiologists’ attack detection perfor-
mance with knowledge of the attack. Fig. 13 summarizes these
results and provides the radiologists’ accuracy (ACC) and area
under the curve (AUC). An AUC of 1.0 indicates a perfect
binary classifier, whereas an AUC of 0.5 indicates random
guessing. The results show that the radiologists could not
consistently tell the difference between real and fake cancers
or identify the locations of removed cancers.
With regards to the attack success rates (bottom of Fig. 11),
knowledge of the attack did not significantly affect cancer
removal (90% from 95.8%). However, the success of the cancer
injection was affected (70% from 99.2%). Moreover, R2 also
picked up on a particular pattern which gave away several
instances. This is a promising result, since it indicates that a
portion of CT-GAN’s attacks can be mitigated by educating
radiologists. However, aside from low accuracy (61% for de-
tecting an injection and 39% for detecting a removal), there was
a significant number of false positives. With a high likelihood
of making a mistake, a radiologist may choose not to report
abnormalities. This is also apparent from the low confidence
scores which the radiologists gave decisions (see Fig. 14).
In summary, both radiologists and AI are highly susceptible
to CT-GAN’s image tampering attacks. Although knowledge
of the attack can help mitigate some cases of cancer injection,
the error rates and confidence scores suggest that the attack
may not be reported in most cases.
6.4 Baseline Analysis
As mentioned earlier, the attacker cannot use Photoshop on the
images. This may be due to a time restriction: the radiologist
may perform the diagnosis immediately after the scan has been
taken, or the malware may be in the viewing application and
operating in real-time. This may also be due to a connectivity
restriction: many PACS do not have a direct connection to the
Internet. Therefore, the attacker would need to infect the PACS
with a malware that can perform the tampering autonomously.
However, for cancer injection, one may argue that there are
simpler automated methods than using a GAN. For example,
the malware could simply paste a pre-saved cropped image
of cancer into a scan at a candidate location (found using steps
1 and 2 in Fig. 8). Therefore, to validate the use of a GAN, we
evaluated this splice attack as a baseline comparison.
The experiment was setup as follows. To create our set
of ‘pre-saved cancers’ we carefully cut out ten 32x32x32
cubes of real cancerous nodules from [54]. We then removed
the irrelevant background tissue by producing transparency
(alpha) channels using equation (1).
The evaluation dataset contained 20 scans in total: 10 FM
and 10 TM. To create a FM scan, we took a random healthy
scan and used steps 1 and 2 of Fig. 8 to select a candidate
injection location. We then pasted one of the pre-saved cancers
into the scan at that location using the transparency channel.
To create the FM scans, we randomly selected 10 sick patients
with exactly one nodule each.
To evaluate the baseline attack, we asked radiologist R2 to
analyze the 20 scans and determine which of the scans were
authentic (TM) and which were tampered (FM) –similar to
the open trial. This task took the radiologist approximately
two hours to perform.
In summary, R2 correctly labeled all of the tampered
scans as fake. The only error was that R2 mislabeled three
of the authentic scans as fake. These results indicate that the
baseline cancer injection attack cannot trick a radiologist, in
comparison to CT-GAN which succeeds nearly every time.
The reason the baseline attack failed to trick R2 is because
the process of automatically pasting cancer creates obvious
artifacts. This is because the pasted samples ignore the
surrounding anatomy and may contain inconsistent noise
patterns (textures). Fig. 15 illustrates some examples of
these abnormalities such as cut bronchi, inconsistent noise
patterns, and unaligned borders. CT-GAN does not produce
these artifacts because it uses in-painting which considers the
original content and surrounding anatomy.
Figure 15: An illustration showing artifacts which can occur
when using an unsupervised splice attack instead of CT-GAN.
Only the middle slice is shown.
7 Countermeasures
The tampering of DICOM medical files is a well-known
concern. In the section we provide a brief overview of
solutions for preventing and detecting this attack.
7.1 Prevention
To mitigate this threat, administrators should secure both
the data-in-motion (DiM) and the data-at-rest (DaR). To
secure data-in-motion, admins should enable encryption
between the hosts in their PACS network using proper SSL
certificates. This may seem trivial, but after discovering this
flaw in the hospital we pen-tested, we turned to the PACS
software provider for comment. The company, with over 2000
installations worldwide, confirmed to us that their hospitals do
not enable encryption in their PACS because “it is not common
practice”. We were also told that some of the PACS don’t
support encryption at all.16 To secure the DaR, servers and
anti-virus software on modality and radiologist workstations
should be kept up to date, and admins should also limit the
exposure which their PACS server has to the Internet.
7.2 Detection
The best way to detect this attack is to have the scanner sign
each scan with a digital signature. The DICOM image file
standard already allows users to store signatures within the
file’s data structure [59, 60]. However, although some PACS
software providers offer this feature, we have not seen it in
use within a PACS. If enabled, admins should check that valid
certificates are being used and that the radiologists’ viewing
applications are indeed verifying the signatures.
Another method for detecting this attack is digital wa-
termarking (DW). A DW is a hidden signal embedded into
an image such that tampering corrupts the signal and thus
indicates a loss of integrity. For medical images, this subject
has been researched in depth [20] and can provide a means for
16See [52] for further comments.
localizing changes in a tampered image. However, we did not
find any medical devices or products which implement DW
techniques. This may be due to the fact that they add noise to
images which may harm the medical analysis.
Tampered images can also be detected with machine
learning. In the supervised setting (where models are trained
on examples of tampered images) the authors in [61] propose
detection by (1) extracting a scan’s noise pattern using a
Wiener filter, then (2) applying a multi-resolution regression
filter on the noise, and then (3) executing an SVM and ELM
together via a Bayesian Sum Rule model. Many domain
specific methods exist for detecting images tampered by
GANs (e.g., images/videos of faces [62–64]). However, the
supervised approach in [65] is more suitable for detecting our
attack since it is domain generic.
Several approaches have been proposed for unsupervised
setting as well. These approaches attempt to detect anomalies
(inconsistencies) within the tampered images. To detect these
inconsistencies, researchers have considered JPEG blocks,
signal processing, and compression/resampling artifacts [66].
For example, in a recent work the authors trained a Siamese net-
work to predict the probability that a pair of patches from two
images have the same EXIF metadata (e.g., focal length and
shutter speed) [67]. In [67], the model is trained using a dataset
of real images only. In [68], the authors proposed ‘noiseprint’
which uses a Siamese network to extract the camera’s unique
noise pattern from an image (PRNU) to find inconsistent
areas. In their evaluation, the authors show that they can
detect GAN-based inpainting. In [69], the authors proposed
three strategies for using PRNU-based tampering localization
techniques with multi-scale analysis. Using this method, the
authors were able to detect forgeries of all shapes and sizes.
While these countermeasures may apply to CT-GAN in
some cases, they do admit some caveats; namely, that (1)
medical scans are usually not compressed so compression
methods are irrelevant, (2) these methods were tested on
2D images and not 3D volumetric imagery, and (3) CT/MR
imaging systems produce very different noise patterns than
standard cameras. For example, we found that the PRNU
method in [69] does not work out-of-the-box on our tampered
CT scans. This is because the noise patterns of CT images are
altered by a radon transform used to construct the image. As
future work, we plan to research how these techniques can be
applied to detecting attacks such as CT-GAN.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced the possibility of an attacker mod-
ifying 3D medical imagery using deep learning. We explained
the motivations for this attack, discussed the attack vectors
(demonstrating one of them), and presented a manipulation
framework (CT-GAN) which can be executed by a malware au-
tonomously. As a case study, we demonstrated how an attacker
can use this approach to inject or remove lung cancer from full
resolution 3D CT scans using free medical imagery from the
Internet. We also evaluated the attack and found that CT-GAN
can fool both humans and machines: radiologists and state-
of-the-art AI. This paper also demonstrates how we should
be wary of closed world assumptions: both human experts and
advanced AI can be fooled if they fully trust their observations.
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Figure 16: Left: the average of 888 CT scans’ middle slices
before scaling to 1:1:1 ratio (black ares are candidate injection
locations). Right: a full slice with an injected nodule.
Figure 17: Examples of where the attack failed in the blind
trial. Left: a removal (FB) detected as ‘ground-glass’ cancer
due to too much additive noise. Right: an injection missed due
to human error.
Figure 18: CT-GAN used to inject brain tumors into MRIs
of healthy brains. Similar to Fig. 7, Top: context, middle:
in-painted result, and bottom: ground-truth. Showing one slice
in a 64x64x16 cuboid.
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Figure 19: Samples of injected (top) and removed (bottom) pulmonary nodules. For each image, the left side is before tampering
and the right side is after. Note, only the middle 2D slice is shown and the images are scaled to different ratios (the source scan).
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Figure 20: All 32 slices from a sample injection before (left) and after (right) tampering with the CT scan.
